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Abstract 
We compare the accuracy of the survey forecasts and forecasts implied by economic binary options on the U.S. non-
farm payroll change. For the first-release data both the market-based and survey forecasts are biased, while they are 
rational and approximately equally accurate for later releases. Both forecasts are also more accurate for later releases. 
Because of predictability in the revision process, this indicates that the investors in the economic derivatives market 
are incapable of taking the measurement error in the preliminary estimates efficiently into account. This suggests that 
economic stability could be enhanced by more accurate first-release figures.
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     1. Introduction
Recently, a market for macroecnomic derivatives, i.e., securities involving bets on future
macroeconomic development, has emerged. For instance, in October 2002, Goldman Sachs
and Deutsche Bank set up a market that allows investors to buy options with payo⁄s de-
pendent on the growth in the non-farm payrolls and the Euro-area harmonized CPI, among
others. Apart from providing means of hedging against macroeconomic risks, these deriva-
tives yield economic forecasts. Data from the ￿rst 2.5 years of this market were analyzed by
G￿rkaynak and Wolfers (2007), who found the market-based forecasts more accurate than
those based on a survey.
The payo⁄s of the current macroeconomic derivatives depend on the ￿rst-release ￿gures
that are inaccurate, and the ￿￿nal￿or ￿true￿values of the economic variables only become
available much later, after a large number of revisions. Typically the ￿rst-release ￿gures are
biased predictions of later releases that are likely to be close to the ￿true￿values although
revisions may still take place even after several years (see Swanson and van Dijk, 2006).
Because the payo⁄s in the economic derivatives market are determined by the ￿rst-release
￿gures, it should be optimal for investors in this market to attempt to predict these particular
data. On the other hand, respondents in surveys conducted among professional forecasters,
such as that studied by G￿rkaynak and Wolfers (2007), have no such incentive, but for them
it should be optimal to attempt to predict the ￿true￿ value that only becomes available
after a long lag. Whether this is really the case, is controversial because the professional
forecasters￿forecasts may be driven by various motives (see Ottaviani and Słrensen (2006)
and Rigobon and Sack (2008)). Our empirical results, however, indicate that the survey
respondents attempt to forecast the ￿￿nal￿￿gures.
G￿rkaynak and Wolfers (2007) compared all the forecasts with the ￿rst-release ￿gures.
However, from the standpoint of forecasting, the ultimate goal is to forecast the ￿true￿
or ￿￿nal￿values, so it would be interesting to see whether the market-based forecasts are
superior to survey forecasts for later releases as well. Moreover, by comparing the accuracy
of the forecasts for di⁄erent releases of data it is possible to assess the degree to which the
investors are able to take the measurement error in the ￿rst-release data into account and
determine what are the data they are actually attempting to forecast. From the practical
point of view, it is important to know which of the two forecasts are more accurate for the
variables we want to forecast, but the results may also have implications for economic theory.
Recently, Bom￿m (2001) showed that the measurement error in preliminary data releases can
be a major source of economic ￿ uctuations. This e⁄ect, however, depends on the economic
agents￿signal extraction capabilities such that if they cannot e¢ ciently ￿lter the noise out of
the ￿rst-release data, reducing the measurement error would lead to less economic volatility.
On the other hand, if they are able to e¢ ciently take the measurement error into account,
macroeconomic volatility increases with improvement in the accuracy of the data. The
intuition behind this is that then agents e⁄ectively discount the preliminary announcements
that they know to be noisy, and if the noise component is reduced, a smaller fraction of
it is attributed to measurement error. Hence, if the investors appear to be forecasting the
￿￿nal￿￿gures instead of the ￿rst-release data, this suggests that they are unable to take
the measurement error e¢ ciently into account, and, according to Bom￿m￿ s (2001) model,
1decreasing the measurement error in the ￿rst-release ￿gures would then have a stabilizing
e⁄ect on the economy.
Using data and methods di⁄erent from ours, Hautsch and Hess (2007) recently found
the price impact of a more precise payroll announcement to be stronger in the U.S. bond
market, suggesting that the agents are to some extent capable of taking the noise in the
released ￿gures into account. As a measure of precision they used the history of absolute
revisions with the idea that the agents use these to assess the accuracy of the latest release.
This is di⁄erent from our approach that only makes use of the prices of the macroeconomic
derivatives that should incorporate all information in the agents￿information set.
We concentrate on comparing the market-based and survey forecasts of the change in
the U.S. non-farm payroll, for which the entire revision history is readily available. The
non-farm payroll can be seen as the most important single U.S. macroeconomic data release
(see, e.g., Fleming and Remolona (1997), who show that it moves the bond market more
than any other news release). It turns out, that forecasts are not rational for the ￿rst-release
￿gures, unlike later releases, indicating that the investors as well as professional forecasters
are actually attempting to forecast the ￿true￿data. This suggests that the investors are
not capable of taking the measurement error in the ￿rst-release data e¢ ciently into account,
lending support to the idea that enhancing the quality of ￿rst-release data would decrease
economic ￿ uctuations. Moreover, the di⁄erences between market-based and survey forecasts
are relatively small, with the survey forecasts actually being somewhat more accurate for
later releases.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The data set is described in Section 2. Section 3
contains the comparisons of the market-based and survey forecasts. In Section 4, we present
the results on the density forecasts implied by the option data. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. Data
In this paper, we consider the U.S. non-farm payroll options, for which the entire revision
history is readily available. Speci￿cally, we focus on the ￿digital range￿ , a contract paying
$1 if the announced economic number lies between two adjacent strike prices. Assuming risk
neutrality, each price can be interpreted as probability of the change in the non-farm payroll
falling in the given range. The market forecast is obtained by calculating the mean assuming
that the probability distribution is uniform within each of these ranges. The options are
traded in auctions for each data release, and our data set comprises the 33 monthly auctions
from October 2002 until June 2005. The auction takes place on the morning of the data
release. For details of the institutional arrangements, see G￿rkaynak and Wolfers (2007).
The survey forecasts are released by Money Market Services (MMS) on the Friday before
each data release. The survey sample consists mainly of professional economists in the
￿nancial markets, and the respondents are surveyed up to a week before the derivatives
auction.1
The payo⁄s are determined with reference to the initial estimate of the growth in the
non-farm payrorolls as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). These ￿rst-release
1We are grateful to Justin Wolfers for providing the data on derivatives and survey forecasts on his web
page.
2Table 1: First, Six-Month and Twelve-Month Releases of the Change in the Non-Farm
Payroll (Thousands of New Jobs).
Date Release Date Release
First 6-Month 12-Month First 6-Month 12-Month
2002:10 ￿ 43 ￿ 84 65 2004:3 21 83 94
2002:11 ￿ 5 69 119 2004:4 308 353 320
2002:12 ￿ 40 1 1 2004:5 288 324 337
2003:1 ￿ 101 ￿ 211 ￿ 211 2004:6 248 208 250
2003:2 143 158 94 2004:7 112 96 106
2003:3 ￿ 308 ￿ 121 ￿ 159 2004:8 32 83 83
2003:4 ￿ 108 ￿ 151 ￿ 110 2004:9 144 188 188
2003:5 ￿ 48 ￿ 22 ￿ 20 2004:10 96 130 130
2003:6 ￿ 17 ￿ 76 ￿ 28 2004:11 337 282 282
2003:7 ￿ 30 ￿ 83 ￿ 14 2004:12 112 132 132
2003:8 ￿ 44 ￿ 45 ￿ 45 2005:1 157 155 155
2003:9 ￿ 93 ￿ 25 ￿ 25 2005:2 146 124 76
2003:10 57 67 67 2005:3 262 300 265
2003:11 126 88 88 2005:4 110 122 140
2003:12 57 83 83 2005:5 274 292 228
2004:1 1 8 8 2005:6 78 126 106
2004:2 112 159 117
￿gures are inaccurate, and they will be subsequently revised multiple times. The entire
revision history is extracted from the Real-Time Data Set of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia. In the empirical analyses we concentrate on the data released six and twelve
months after the ￿rst release for ease of exposition. Because revisions do not take place
every month, little additional insight would be provided by discussing all possible revision
dates separately. Ideally, we would like to consider the ￿￿nal￿values that have undergone a
greater number of revisions, but because the market for macroeconomic derivatives has been
started only recently, only approximately one year￿ s worth of revised estimates are available
for the latest observations in the option data set. Hence, later revisions cannot be considered
without leaving out observations from our already very limited data set. Still, as the ￿gures
in Table 1 show, all the initial releases have been revised once after six months and most of
them twice after 12 months, and the revisions can be quite sizeable.
3. Accuracy of Point Forecasts
Following G￿rkaynak and Wolfers (2007), we begin the empirical analysis by comparing the
market-based and survey forecasts to the released ￿gures. While G￿rkaynak and Wolfers
(2007) only considered the ￿rst-release data, we present results also for revised data released
six and twelve months after the expiration date of the option. By studying the forecast
errors we get an idea of how accurate the forecasts implied by the option prices are for each
release of data. Panels A and B of Table 2 contain the mean absolute forecast errors (MAE)
3Table 2: Comparing the Accuracy and E¢ ciency of the Mean Forecasts for the First, Six-
Month and Twelve-Month Releases of the Change in the Non-Farm Payroll.
Release
First 6-Month 12-Month
Panel A: Mean Absolute Error (MAE)
Market 84.2 (11.3) 82.9 (9.6) 77.5 (10.2)
Survey 86.1 (11.4) 82.1 (10.1) 76.8 (10.1)
Panel B: Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE)
Market 105.6 (48.9) 99.1 (47.8) 96.9 (47.2)
Survey 107.6 (57.8) 100.0 (48.9) 95.2 (47.4)
Panel C: Horse Race Regression
Actualt = ￿ + ￿Markett + ￿Surveyt
Market (￿) 0.97 (0.87) 0.57 (0.83) 0.43 (0.80)
Survey (￿) ￿ 0.02 (0.97) 0.44 (0.92) 0.50 (0.89)
Panel D: E¢ ciency Regression
Forecast errort = ￿
Market ￿ 33.79 (18.05) ￿ 20.79 (17.29) ￿ 17.48 (16.54)
Survey ￿ 33.92 (17.68) ￿ 20.92 (17.12) ￿ 17.61 (16.84)
Market and Survey denote the market-based and survey forecasts, respec-
tively. The ￿gures in parentheses are standard errors.
and root mean squared forecast errors (RMSE) for each of the three releases considered. For
comparison, we also present results for survey forecasts released by Money Market Services
on the Friday before the ￿rst data release. The table shows quite clearly that, on average,
both market-based and survey forecasts are most accurate for the twelve-month release and
the accuracy improves monotonously after the ￿rst release. Moreover, the di⁄erences seem
to be quite large. Assuming that the releases converge to the most accurate possible, ￿￿nal￿ ,
estimate, this suggests that the agents actually forecast the ￿￿nal￿value, indicating their
inability to take the measurement errors made by the BLS into account.
The di⁄erences between the market-based and survey forecasts are, in general, minor.
However, for the ￿rst-release data, according to the MAE and RMSE criteria the market-
based ￿gures are more accurate. This is in line with G￿rkaynak and Wolfers (2007) and
not surprising since the payo⁄s of the derivatives depend on the ￿rst-release data. For the
twelve-month ￿gures that are supposedly closest to the ￿￿nal￿value, the survey forecasts
are actually more accurate, but the di⁄erences are somewhat smaller than for the ￿rst-
release data. These di⁄erences are not statistically signi￿cant at conventional signi￿cance
levels, suggesting that the market-based forcasts are not superior to survey forecasts. Median
forecasts yield similar results, and therefore they are not reported.2
To further compare the option-based and survey forecasts, we report in Panel C of Table
2The results are available upon request.
42 the results of the ￿horse race￿regression suggested by Fair and Shiller (1990), where the
actual released ￿gure is regressed on a constant, and the option-based and survey forecasts.
The results for the 6 and 12-month releases di⁄er markedly from those for the ￿rst release.
The regressors are, of course, strongly correlated and, therefore, the standard errors are
large. Therefore, the results should be interpreted with care. Still, in line with G￿rkaynak
and Wolfers (2007), the estimates suggest that the survey forecast is uninformative in the case
of the ￿rst-release data, for which the coe¢ cients of the option-based and survey forecasts
are very close to unity and zero, respectively. For the later releases, however, the estimated
coe¢ cients suggest that the two forecasts are more or less equally important, lending support
to the results concerning the forecast errors in Panels A and B.
The results of the test of forecast e¢ ciency are presented in Panel D of Table 2. Three
conclusions emerge. First, both the option-based and survey forecasts are downward biased
for all three releases of data, but the bias is much larger for the ￿rst than the later releases.
Second, the di⁄erences between the option-based and survey forecasts are very small. Third,
the bias is statistically signi￿cant at the 10% level only for the ￿rst-release data, with p-values
of approximately 0.06 for both forecasts. For the later releases, the p-values exceed 20%,
indicating insigni￿cance of the bias for the ￿￿nal￿￿gures. These results can be interpreted
in favor of the agents￿inability to e¢ ciently take into account the estimation error inherent
in the ￿rst-release data. In other words, the later releases appear to be closer to what the
agents actually are forecasting. This is good news from the viewpoint of using the market-
based and survey forecasts, as they do not seem to be contaminated by the estimation error
inherent in the ￿rst-release data. However, the results deviate from the ￿ndings of Balduzzi
et al. (1998) and Andersen et al. (2003) in that they found the survey forecasts to be
unbiased also for the ￿rst-release ￿gures. On the other hand, the result of unbiasedness of
the market forecasts only for the revised ￿gures reinforces the impression that the agents
are not acting rationally in forming expectations, because the pro￿ts accruing from option
trading depend on the ability to speci￿cally forecast the ￿rst-release data.
4. Accuracy of Density Forecasts
In addition to the point forecast, the derivatives market yields a full probability distribution
for each date, which facilitates the analysis of the accuracy of density forecasts for any release
of data. Based on the results for the mean predictions above, our expectation is that the
agents￿predictive distribution is consistent rather with later releases than the ￿rst release.
To examine the correctness of the conditional predictive distribution of the market for the





fk;t￿1 (x)dx; t = 1;2;:::;T;
where fk;t￿1 (￿) is the conditional predictive density extracted from the derivatives data and
ykt is the observed value of the change in the non-farm payroll given by the kth release
at date t. If the conditional density is correct, the distribution of the sequence fzktg
T
t=1
is independently and unformly on [0, 1] distributed for each k. To check for uniformity,
5Pearson￿ s goodness-of-￿t test can be used. The test statistic is based on a histogram of
fzktg
T






where Ti is the number of observations in the ith bin. If zkt really is uniformly distributed,
Ti should equal T=m for all i, i.e., there should be equal number of observations in each
bin. Under the null hypothesis this test statistic follows asymptotically the chi-square dis-
tribution with m ￿ 1 degrees of freedom. In addition to a formal test, Diebold et al. (1998)
recommended examining the uniformity graphically by plotting the histogram on which the
test is based, as this may give further information on the shortcomings of the predictive dis-
tribution. The hypothesis of no serial correlation in the level and square of the probability
integral transform can be tested by using the standard Ljung-Box test.
Figure 1: Probability Integral Transforms of the First, Six-Month and Twelve-Month Re-
leases of the Non-Farm Payroll Change based on the Derivatives Data.
The histograms of the probability integral transform series along with the pointwise 95%
con￿dence bands are presented in Figure 1. Only the ￿rst-release data exhibits a violation
of uniformity; for the later releases, all the bins are included in the 95% con￿dence bands. It
seems that the market forecasts put too much emphasis on the lower tail of the distribution
to conform to the ￿rst-release values. This is in accordance with the result above that the
6Table 3: Testing the Accuracy of the Predictive Distributions implied by the Derivatives for
the Non-Farm Payroll Change.
Release
First 6-Month 12-Month
Pearson￿ s Goodness-of-Fit Test 0.020 0.337 0.511
Level Autocorrelation Test 0.458 0.358 0.333
Square Autocorrelation Test 0.110 0.296 0.627
The ￿gures are marginal signi￿cance levels.
market forecasts are downward biased for the ￿rst-release data but not for later releases.
The results of Pearson￿ s goodness-of-￿t test based on this histogram in Table 3 con￿rm this
￿nding. Uniformity of the probability integral transform is clearly rejected for the ￿rst-
release data (p-value equals 0.02), while it cannot be rejected for the other two releases at
reasonable signi￿cance levels. The hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the levels and squares
of the probability integral transform cannot be rejected for any of the releases.
All in all, the results thus indicate that the distribution of the market forecast is more
accurate for the distribution of later releases than that of the ￿rst release, in accordance with
the results obtained for the mean forecasts above. Because the later releases are presumably
more accurate in the sense of being closer to the ￿￿nal￿or ￿true￿values, these ￿ndings thus
suggests that it is the ￿true￿distribution that the agents are attempting to forecast. In other
words, they are unable to take the measurement error of the BLS into account, although
in the derivatives market it clearly would be optimal to forecast the erroneous ￿rst-release
￿gure, upon which the payo⁄s are determined.
5. Conclusion
We considered the forecasts of the U.S. non-farm payroll change implied by the market
for economic derivatives and the MMS survey. Unlike the recent study by G￿rkaynak and
Wolfers (2007), we study the properties of these forecasts with respect to revised values in
addition to the ￿rst-release data.
The implications of our ￿ndings are twofold. First, contrary to what the results of
G￿rkaynak and Wolfers (2007) might lead one to believe, the di⁄erences in forecast accuracy
between the market-based and survey forecasts are minor, and, as a matter of fact, the survey
forecasts tend to be more accurate for the ￿￿nal￿values. This result emerges from analyzing
both the point and density forecasts. Hence, in light of these ￿ndings, there is little reason
to prefer the market-based to survey forecasts. Second, investors in the economic derivatives
market are unable to take the measurement error in the initial estimates of the BLS e¢ ciently
into account, but they seem to be forecasting the ￿true￿non-farm payroll change, although
their pro￿ts depend on accurately forecasting the ￿rst-release data. According to Bom￿m￿ s
(2001) model, this lends support to the idea that improvements in the quality of ￿rst-release
data would decrease economic ￿ uctuations.
Because the market for economic derivatives has existed for only a short time, the sample
considered is relatively small, and although the results are qualitatively consistent, strong
7statistical signi￿cance is di¢ cult to establish. In particular, it is possible that the pre-
dictability in the revision process is particular to our sample period although there is some
evidence on general predictability (see, e.g., Haltom et al., 2005). The derivatives data are
also very recent, so that even the most recent revised estimates of the non-farm payroll
changes available may still deviate from the ￿￿nal￿values. Therefore, it would be interest-
ing to see whether the obtained conclusions hold in an extended data set. It might also be
worth studying whether the predictability in the revision process could be exploited to make
excess pro￿ts in the economic derivatives market. We only studied the market for derivatives
written on the U.S. non-farm payroll change, which is considered the most important U.S.
macroeconomic data release. However, it would be interesting to see whether similar results
are obtained for other economic derivatives. We leave these issues for future research.
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